NATO's secret battle

October 1999

In a reconstruction by Dana Priest, published in the Washington Post and NRC Handelsblad -- September 19 to 21 -- it became evident that NATO was involved in a second battle: the one between allied generals and politicians. Everyone seemed to agree that air power was working. But would it be sufficient? A ground option seemed to be doomed even before the war had started. There was a plan A, but not a plan B. And what were the factors that contributed to Milosevic's sudden retreat? In a series of excellent articles, the Washington Post reconstructed the difficulties behind the scenes. An excerpt.

By Dana Priest

Early Planning

Planning for the war started in June 1998, when some 40 versions were produced.

Originally, there were three phases. In phase 1, anti-aircraft defenses and command bunkers would be struck. Phase 2 would extend the strikes to Yugoslavia's infrastructure below the 44th parallel, well south of Belgrade. Only in phase 3 the capital would be struck. That was plan A. There was no plan B. NATO did not plan for a longer campaign, since member states might not have started the war in the first place, realizing it would be a long struggle.

Option B-minus

On the first day of the war, US president Clinton said he did not intend to get US ground troops involved. NATO commander General Clark was convinced some ground option had to be looked into before winter and a few weeks later he polled the view of British and US officers on ground options. NATO secretary general Solana was persuaded by US security advisor Sandy Berger to authorize these secret talks, despite the Pentagons position.

In April, just prior to the NATO-50 talks, Clinton urged British prime minister Blair to stop talking about an invasion publicly, since it was causing domestic problems for allies. In return, Clinton agreed to allow NATO to update existing plans.

By May, Clark came up with a plan for an invasion from the south by 175,000 troops, through a single road from Albania. This plan was called the "B-minus" option by the White House, indicating its position. Clark hoped to get approval from Clinton by June 1 and to have troops on the ground by September 1. But the Pentagon received the plan with skepticism, hoping the air attacks alone would do the trick. In anticipation of Clarks plan, preparations by US, German, and Italian units had commenced, strengthening the road in Albania so it could carry the weight of the Bradley vehicles.

One of the biggest advocates of a ground invasion was British defense secretary Robertson, who was prepared to commit 50,000 troops. The British government said it would be unprofessional not to prepare for a worst-case scenario. The matter had increased friction between General Clark and US defense secretary Cohen, who strongly opposed any ground option. The German and Italian defense ministers did not immediately oppose an invasion, although they had some objections. The French thought there was no time to prepare for an invasion before winter. The five defense ministers agreed consensus on the ground option had to be reached within a week. NATO could not afford to loose this one.

Targeting Decisions

Political leaders became involved in the targeting decisions, as civilian casualties had an impact at home on the support for the war. Despite the tension, military leaders became more and more convinced that it was not sufficient to target only military bunkers, barracks and ammunition depots, but also factories, bridges, TV stations, and power plants. Target selection became a source of friction amongst the allies.

After the Interior Ministry in Belgrade was hit by cruise missiles, French president Chirac demanded a say in crucial decisions. Clinton agreed, although he stated the target approval process was already too slow. It was agreed Chirac would have a veto on targets in Montenegro. British prime minister Blair wanted a veto over all targets struck by B-52's taking off from British soil. All three wanted a veto over targets with a possibility of high casualties or that could affect many civilians, such as power grids.

Also, US secretary of state Albright and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy held a five-way conference call almost every day. In a way this helped to keep unity amongst the five. All nineteen members of the North Atlantic Council agreed to give their proxy on sensitive targeting decisions to the secretary general. Solana, in turn, listened carefully to the US, Britain, and France, while also making sure none of the other allies would actually block such decisions.

Crossing Threshold

The agreement between the US, Britain and France caused some difficulties for General Clark, when trying to get approval for targets, for example, Podgorica airport/air base and Belgrade's two main TV towers, one of which was atop the Socialist Party headquarters. In this particular case, the Pentagon warned western journalists to stay out of the building. Planes were already underway on April 12 when information indicated that journalists might be inside. The planes were ordered to turn around. The Socialist Party building was struck on April 21 and the state TV and radio building on April 23.

During the summit on behalf of NATO's 50th anniversary, allied unity was somewhat strengthened by the prospect of actually losing the first war. It was agreed that targets would be struck that affected large numbers of civilians, such as transportation, water and electricity.

US commanders wanted to strike Yugoslavia's electrical system in the first few days of the war, but France opposed damage that would take weeks to repair. The US proposed one of their new weapons, the CBU-94, which could take out power for just hours. On May 3, this weapon was used for the first time. Later, the French agreed on more severe strikes on the power system.

Mount Pastrik

Since April, CIA and NATO had been working with the KLA, using the Albanian 2nd Army as an intermediary. The KLA rebels allegedly had committed atrocities and were involved in drug smuggling. CIA and US Army special forces in the border town Kukes discussed the possibilities of transforming the KLA into a light infantry force.

A major offensive by the KLA was launched on May 26, with Albanian army support, in order to secure a supply route. But the KLA was losing badly, and 250 of their best troops were stuck on Mount Pastrik, surrounded by 700 Yugoslav troops. Clark insisted that the US would pay with American blood if they would not help the KLA hold it. On June 7, the Yugoslav troops were bombed by two US B-52 bombers.

Damage assessment after the strike as well as observations of vast amounts of Serb troops withdrawing from Kosovo after the war led to the conclusion that the Serbs could have endured for weeks or even months. Which raised the question why Milosevic suddenly retreated.

The first contributing factor undoubtedly was the destruction of Yugoslavia's lifelines: roads, bridges, railways, factories, airports, TV towers, fuel depots and power plants – shutting down the economy and hurting businesses controlled by Milosevic. A second factor could have been the persuasion of the Kremlin to put pressure on Milosevic to end the war. A third factor could have been the battle of Mount Pastrik, which seemed to have been a turning point.

Milosevic Accepted Peace Deal

On June 2, US security advisor Berger met with several foreign policy experts, who had publicly advocated the use of ground troops. Berger announced that if a ground war was needed to win the war, Clinton was prepared to support it. Several plans were outlined, options: establishing "safe havens" within Kosovo, arming the KLA or launching a full-scale invasion through Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Hungary.

However, next day, reports were relayed to Berger's team, indicating that Milosevic told Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that he was prepared to accept the peace deal offered to him. The US remained skeptical. When NATO's ground commander in Kosovo, Lt Gen Jackson, started talks with the Yugoslav high command about a pullout, the bombing continued. And not without reason. On June 7 the talks were suspended and the bombing was intensified. General Clark was still considering the options for an invasion. That evening, USAF B-52's dropped their load on Mount Patstrik. On June 8, an agreement was reached on a draft UN resolution. On June 10, Milosevic signed an agreement.

War Of The Generals

The friction between NATO commander Gen Wesley Clark and top air force commander Lt Gen Michael Short was noticeable to NATO commanders all throughout Europe. Clark insisted that tanks and artillery in Kosovo had to be destroyed. Short considered this useless and wanted to go after strategic targets, such as Yugoslav ministries and power plants. The disagreement was illustrated when bombers were about to destroy the Serbian special police headquarters in Belgrade. Short called it the "jewel in the crown". "To me, the jewel in the crown is when those B-52s rumble across Kosovo", Clark responded. Short: "You and I have known for weeks that we have different jewelers". Clark: "My jeweler outranks yours".

Air force officers thought of the enemy as a snake and wanted to chop off its head by bombing Belgrade. Some bristled at orders to attack what they considered the tail: individual tanks and small units of soldiers in Kosovo. The air force's dissatisfaction partly originated from unscripted nature of the first few weeks of the campaign, when NATO still thought Milosevic would back down after a few days. But instead, he pushed deeper into Kosovo.

This change in strategy resulted in a continuous struggle for approval to hit strategic targets and to determine how many planes to send to Kosovo and how many directly over Serbia. Pilots were called back when their mission changed at the last minute or when approval did not come on time. The navy sometimes had ample time to properly recalculate the flight paths of Tomahawk missiles.

Different Strategy

Air force doctrine would have called for heavy strikes on the first nights of the campaign. Lt Gen Short was not the only one with doubts about the strategy. Gen Clark also had doubt but he felt this was the biggest war he could get NATO to approve. But when Milosevic did not back down within the first days, he began to adjust the prognosis. He asked secretary general Solana to switch to phase 2 and also strike targets from phase 3, trying not to disturbing the alliance's fragile balance. Allies were unhappy with the thought of striking targets in Belgrade, air force commanders were unhappy with the idea of striking tanks and troops in Kosovo.

And there was the fundamental difference in opinion between Clark and Short. Short -- and many other air force commanders -- considered it a waste of time and resources to strike Milosevic's 3rd Army in Kosovo: "Body bags coming home from Kosovo didn't bother [Milosevic]". Later, Clark said he didn't need to be convinced, but he wanted to strike Serbian forces in Kosovo, as well.

Some air force officers were so critical of the war's execution that they fed retired colleagues with information and urged them to speak out. However, in the end, Clark pushed hard for approval for exactly the type of targets the air force was looking for.

Source: NRC, Washington Post/Dana Priest.