Media war
NATO v. Serbia
Apart from the military campaign, there was the media war. The Yugoslavs learned from their war in Bosnia and were doing relatively well in showing the world images of the terror caused by the "criminals" of NATO. No opportunity was lost to show victims of air strikes and damage to civilian houses. Sometimes NATO seemed to be embarrassed by the unavoidable collateral — yet relatively minor — damage caused during the many hundreds of sorties flown daily. In the third week of the campaign, over four hundred sorties a day were flown and later in the campaign this number reached well over six hundred. See also the statistics.
On April 14, 1999, on the 22nd day, the Yugoslavs said that NATO attacked a convoy with ethnic Albanians on the run south of the city of Djakovica. The convoy seemed to be under the escort of police units. NATO did not comment on the event until a day later, when an incident was admitted, north of Djakovica. However, both parties seemed to refer to different locations.
When it came to propaganda Belgrade seemed to be the greater. Some experts blamed this on the clumsiness of NATO in handling the media or even a lack of outspokenness. On one hand there was the moralistic view on the event, on the other hand there was the more realistic view of war demanding victims, both civilian and military.
The proper response to the tragic event should have been to admit that allied planes were in the vicinity at that time and that it could have happened. If mistakes are made, mistakes should be admitted.
On many occasions the Serb media, controlled by the state, showed damage to civilian targets and blamed NATO. However, these images could never be confirmed by independent sources. The footage shot by journalists was always subject to Serb restrictions.
During the campaign the number of daily strike missions was increased and more and more planes were used for strike missions on an increasing number of targets. The number of incidents with "collateral damage" also increased. Yet only a relatively small number of incidents occurred.
Psychological Warfare
Apart from the battle of the media, there was Psy-Ops. From USAF Hercules aircraft — normally stationed at Ramstein, Germany — transmissions from Radio Free Europe and Voice of America were relayed for reception in Serbia. In special broadcasts, a woman's voice made it clear that ethnical cleansing was not an honorable thing to do for a professional army. But the voice of "Ramstein Rachel" and the many pamphlets dropped over Kosovo were just a few of the aspects of Psy-Ops.
Aftermath
On Friday September 17, 1999, during a press meeting, NATO proved in front of the international media that their estimates of targets hit during the air campaign, were almost always correct. NATO commander General Clark and no less than 20 pilots elaborated on some of the actions, using cockpit video footage, aerial pictures, statements of forward observers on the ground as well as local investigations. It was well-proven that of the 181 tanks targeted, 93 were destroyed; of the 371 armored vehicles hit, 153 were destroyed; 339 military vehicles and 389 artillery pieces were destroyed. Nine tanks that were thought to be destroyed, later turned out to be dummies.
Using video images, it was proven that many of the destroyed equipment was removed out of sight by the Serbs to keep up moral of their own troops and to mislead NATO. General Clark said that even the respectable newspapers quoted the Serb statement that no more than 13 tanks were destroyed.
Clark said that some 97,000 Serbs were still in Kosovo, out of the 200,000 Serbs originally present before the end of the campaign. This figure was three times more than what was mentioned so far.